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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED TO
PHYSICAL AND LEGAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS
UPHELD UNDER TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)*
I.

FACTS

In September 1996, George Lane was called to appear at a county
courthouse in a criminal proceeding.' Lane was charged with driving with
a revoked license and possessing prescription medication. 2 In an unrelated
incident, he had been seriously injured and lost one of his legs in an
automobile accident. 3 As a result, he was confined to a wheelchair and
unable to walk or climb stairs. 4 The courthouse in Benton, Polk County,
Tennessee was on the second floor and the building had no elevator. 5
Consequently, Lane was forced to physically drag himself to the second
floor courtroom by crawling up the steps. 6 In a subsequent, mandatory
court appearance regarding the same set of charges, Lane refused to crawl
up the stairs to the second floor courtroom or to be assisted up the stairs by
officers of the court. 7 Lane claimed that if he would have allowed court
officers to assist him by carrying him up the stairs to the second floor, he
would be putting his safety at risk. 8 Lane refused to agree to hold the
preliminary hearing for his case in the courthouse's first floor library and
also refused the court's offer to hold any subsequent proceedings in an
accessible courtroom in another county. 9 Consequently, he was arrested
and jailed for failure to appear. 10
*Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
1. Brief for the Private Respondents at 4, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 021667).
2. John A. MacDonald, Fighting For Access Rights: Tennessee Case Pits Disabilities Act
Against l1th Amendment, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 11, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WL
58832780.
3. Id.
4. Private Respondents' Brief at 4, Lane (No. 02-1667).
5. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
6. Private Respondents' Brief at 4, Lane (No. 02-1667).
7. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514 (2004).
8. Private Respondents' Brief at 5, Lane (No. 02-1667).
9. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3-4, Lane (No. 02-1667).
10. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
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Like George Lane, Beverly Jones suffered from mobility impairments
and used a wheelchair." Jones was employed as a professional court
reporter. 12 She claimed that a large number of Tennessee courthouses were
inaccessible to her due to physical barriers, and as a result, she has been
unable to work and has lost employment in Trousdale, Jackson, Clay, and
Pickett counties. 13 Jones claims that she requested modifications to
accommodate her disability in the four above-named Tennessee counties,
but none of the requests were granted.14 On one occasion, Jones accepted
the assistance of others and allowed herself to be carried to some
courtrooms, but "lost patience after she had to be carried to an inaccessible
restroom by a judge."15
George Lane and Beverly Jones separately filed suit against the state of
Tennessee and a number of individual Tennessee counties on August 10,
1998.16 Lane and Jones claimed Tennessee was liable for "past and
ongoing violations" of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA").17 Both Lane and Jones, as paraplegics confined to wheelchairs,
asserted that they were denied physical and legal access to the state court
systems by reason of their disabilities.18
Tennessee moved to dismiss Lane and Jones' original suits on the
grounds that state sovereign immunity, granted to the state under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, protected it from
suit. 19 The District Court denied the motion, and Tennessee appealed the
decision. 20 The United States intervened to defend Title II's valid
2
abrogation of Tennessee's Eleventh Amendment immunity challenge. 1
However, Tennessee's appeal was stayed when the United States Supreme

11. Private Respondents' Brief at 5, Lane (No. 02-1667).
12. Id.
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 021667).
14. Private Respondents' Brief at 6, Lane (No. 02-1667).
15. MacDonald, supra note 2, at Al.
16. Private Respondents' Brief at 6-7, Lane (No. 02-1667); see also Petitioner's Reply Brief
at 2 n. 1, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667) (explaining that the four other
plaintiffs mentioned in private respondents' brief, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey Sr.,
Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russel Larson, were joined as parties to the original lawsuit in the district
court action after Tennessee moved for dismissal, and consequently, their claims were not part of
the appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and were not at issue in the petition to the Supreme Court).
17. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000) (setting forth the
provisions of Title II of the ADA).
18. Private Respondents' Brief at 3-4, Lane (No. 02-1667). Respondents cited twenty-three
separate Tennessee counties in which portions of the courthouse were inaccessible. Id.
19. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Court heard arguments in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v.
Garrett.22 In Garrett, the Court determined that the Eleventh Amendment
barred private lawsuits seeking monetary relief for violations of Title I of
the ADA,23 but did not decide the validity of claims under Title 11.24
Following Garrett,the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard arguments
in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.25 In Popovich,
the plaintiff brought suit against the state for Title II violations for failing to
provide him with a hearing assistance device in the plaintiff's child custody
case. 26 The Popovich court held that when a Title II claim is based on due
process rather than equal protection grounds, Congress may validly
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under the power granted to it by
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 7 Tennessee filed for a rehearing,
arguing that Popovich was not controlling because Lane and Jones' original
complaints did not allege a due process violation. 28 The Sixth Circuit
declined to adopt Tennessee's argument, and affirmed the decision to deny
Tennessee's motion.29 The court held that because the right of access to the
courts is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, Title II
was a proper, reasonable remedy to correct the widespread constitutional
violation of denying individuals with disabilities access to the court
system. 30 However, the Sixth Circuit did not altogether reject the State's
argument and remanded the case for further proceedings. 31 The court noted
that the case contained issues that could not be resolved "absent a factual
record."

32

The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari. 33 The Lane Court
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and held that Title II of the ADA,
22. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000) (setting forth Title I, which prohibits
discrimination against the disabled in the employment context). The general prohibition clause
states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. § 12112.
24. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
25. 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
26. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 811.
27. Id. at 815.
28. Lane, 541 U.S. at 515.
29. Id. at 514-15.
30. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2003).
31. Lane, 541 U.S. at 515.
32. Id.
33. Tennessee v. Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2003). The order granting certiorari limited the issue
to be heard, however, to Question One in the Petition. Id. Question One asked "Whether Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2002), exceeds
Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby failing validly to
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as it applied to the "fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a
valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 34
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") applies to a
35
state sovereign as a provider of public programs, services, or activities.
However, holding a state sovereign liable under Title II conflicts with a
state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 36 Eleventh
Amendment immunity may be either given up by the state voluntarily, or
validly abrogated only pursuant Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce the amendment's substantive guarantees. 37 The constitutionality of
remedial Section 5 legislation is determined by applying the congruent and

proportional test. 38 The congruent and proportional test was then later
refined and specifically applied to an action involving Title I of the ADA.39
A.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISABLED AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT.

The ADA passed by large majorities in both houses of the United
States Congress, was enacted in 1990 to remedy the widespread, pervasive
discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities. 40 Discrimination
"tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities" and was a
"serious and pervasive social problem." 41 Disabled individuals had "no
legal recourse to redress discrimination" unlike individuals discriminated
against on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.4 2 Congress
provided extensive documentation of its findings of such discrimination in

abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private damage claims." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
34. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing the general grant of state sovereign immunity
from suit).
37. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (providing that a state may voluntarily
surrender its sovereign immunity if it chooses); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(stating that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only valid constitutional basis under
which Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated).
38. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
39. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365,368 (2001).
40. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,516 (2004).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
42. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
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its consideration of the legislation. 43 Congress reached these conclusions
after it held thirteen committee hearings, established a task force which held
public forums and discussed the problem of inaccessible courthouses, and
collected testimony from over 5,000 individuals claiming they had been the
victim of discrimination at the hands of state and local governments. 44
Claims of discrimination by the state against the disabled were well
litigated both before and after passage of the ADA. States were found to
have wrongfully committed disabled individuals to mental hospitals, to
have wrongfully confined and restrained disabled patients within state-run
mental hospitals, and to have failed to provide disabled prisoners with
adequate, accessible restroom facilities.4 5 Cases have also documented
discrimination against the disabled in access to public education where, for
example, the mentally retarded were either segregated from the general
public school population or were excluded from public schools altogether.4 6
Additionally, public voting sites were found to be physically inaccessible to
individuals in wheelchairs. 47 Discrimination against the disabled in the
context of actual legal or physical access to the judicial system was also

43. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 101-485 (III) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445
(presenting a sampling of Congress's findings). The House report cited a number of surveys,
including one by Louis Harris and Associates, noting that people with disabilities are poorer, have
less education, and are socially and economically disadvantaged. Id. at 447-48. However the
long-standing problems faced by the disabled were likely the result of outdated stereotypes,
misperceptions, and "discriminatory policies and practices" towards people with disabilities. Id. at
448. These discriminatory practices affected the every day lives of the disabled in every area
including securing employment, participating in their communities, obtaining custody of their
children, and "enjoying all of the rights that Americans take for granted." Id.
44. Brief for the United States at 16-17, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 021667) (citing Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From
ADA to Empowerment 16 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Report], Staff of the House Comm. On
Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legis. Hist. of Pub. L. No. 101-336: Americans With
Disabilities Act 1040 (Comm. Print 1990)).
45. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972) (holding that application of different
commitment and release standards to disabled individuals in a state-run mental hospital is an equal
protection violation); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (determining that residents
of a mental hospital have a constitutional right to be free from restraint by the hospital's
employees); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that prison
officials wrongly forced a disabled prisoner to use a catheter rather than providing him accessible
restroom facilities, and did not provide him with timely, necessary physical therapy and medical
attention). See also Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016 (D. Kan. 1999) (providing a
post-ADA claim by a prisoner forced to crawl on the floor because his cell was wheelchair
inaccessible).
46. See N.Y. State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 504-05
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding the local school board's plan to segregate mentally retarded children
from the general school population to be unconstitutional); Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist. of
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (explaining that failure to provide "exceptional"
children with publicly supported education was a violation of the United States Constitution, the
laws of the District of Columbia, and the regulations of the school board itself).
47. New York ex rel Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12, 13 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
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well documented. For example, in Matthews v. Jefferson,48 a court forced a
litigant scheduled to appear at a hearing to be carried up the stairs to a
second floor courtroom rather than move the hearing to a different room.4 9
The court held that the state was in violation of the ADA not only for the
failure to consider moving the hearing to an accessible room, but also for
failing to make arrangements to help the litigant to the first floor during the
lunch break, failing to allow him access to a wheelchair accessible
restroom, and failing to make arrangements to bring him to the first floor at
the conclusion of the day's proceedings.50 In addition to the actual physical
exclusion, some lower courts found the state or local governments to have
improperly and categorically excluded individuals with disabilities, such as
blindness, from even participating in the judicial process by serving on
juries.5 '
Title II of the ADA addresses such discrimination in physical and legal
access to public services, programs, and activities.52 The section defining
discrimination provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 53 To be considered a
qualified individual with a disability, a person must "with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meet the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity."5 4 A public entity includes "any State or local
government," and any "department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 55 The
question of whether Title II of the ADA allows individuals to bring suit for
damages against a state governmental entity for violations of Title II

48. 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
49. Matthews, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 533; see also Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472-73 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the state violated the ADA and denied wheelchair bound litigants access
to the courthouse because of the physically inaccessible second floor courtroom, inadequate
restrooms to accommodate a wheelchair, and lack of handicapped parking spaces outside the
courthouse, even though the state attempted to accommodated the litigants by holding the hearing
being attended in a first-floor hallway).
50. Id. at 533-34.
51. Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
53. Id. § 12132.
54. Id. § 12131(2).
55. Id. § 12131(1)(A)-(B).
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necessarily implicates the constitutional protection of state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
B.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment states, "the U]udicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens...
or Subjects of any Foreign State." 56 Strictly read, the text of the
amendment only prohibits suits by citizens of one state against another
state. However, it has long been interpreted to also prevent citizens from
filing suit against the state in which they reside. 57 The concept of state
sovereign immunity pre-dates not only the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment but also the Constitution itself and "is a fundamental aspect of
the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
58
Constitution."
State sovereign immunity is not absolute. 59 The Eleventh Amendment
protection does not apply when the defendant is a "non-state governmental
entity" 60 such as a county or city government or where the defendant is an
officer or agent of the state; 6 1 where the suit is by another state or by the
United States against a separate individual state; 62 or when the suit is for

56. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (asserting that the
Eleventh Amendment has been long interpreted to also prohibit suits by individuals against the
state in which they are a citizen); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)
(affirming that individuals may not sue a state not explicitly subjecting itself to suit); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (maintaining that suits by a citizen against their own state was
not included in the Eleventh Amendment primarily because it was not allowable at common law
prior to the Constitution's adoption).
58. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
59. See id. at 756 (explaining that the protection of the Eleventh Amendment does not apply
to a "municipal corporation" or other non-state governmental entity).
60. See Seth A. Horvath, Note, Disentangling the Eleventh Amendment and the Americans
With DisabilitiesAct: Alternative Remedies For State-Initiated Disability Discrimination Under
Title I and Title 11, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 231, 235-36 (2004) (clarifying the Eleventh
Amendment's inapplicability to non-state governmental units such as a city or county
government). But see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (setting
forth the rule that for purposes of administering the court system, state and local courts are treated
as an arm of the state).
61. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57 (providing that a plaintiff may seek money damages
against a state officer for constitutional violations conducted in that officer's individual capacity,
if the relief is sought from the officer, not from the state treasury).
62. Id. at 755.
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injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent that officer from acting in
63
contradiction to protections under the United States Constitution.
However, the two most important ways in which the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to the states include voluntary surrender of
immunity, and involuntary abrogation of the immunity which requires
Congress to express its intent to do so, and to act pursuant to a valid
exercise of a grant of constitutional authority.6 4
1.

Consent to or Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Eleventh Amendment immunity is a "personal privilege which [the
state] may waive at [its] pleasure." 65 In rare instances, a state will
voluntarily give up the protections of the Eleventh Amendment and consent
to being sued by private parties. 66 For example, a state may decide that it is
sound public policy to provide a private right of action to its citizens against
the state. 67
A state waives its protections under the amendment when it invokes the
jurisdiction of a federal court, or if the state makes a clear, distinct
proclamation that it intends to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction. 68 The
consent to suit or immunity waiver requirement is so specific that a state
may not give up the immunity merely by subjecting itself to suit in state
court, by making a general statement that it intends to "sue and be sued," or
by having a general policy of allowing lawsuits against it in "any court of
competent jurisdiction." 69

63. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-51 (1908) (stating injunctions may be issued to
prevent an officer from "executing a state law in conflict with the Constitution or a statute of the
United States, when such execution will violate the rights of the complainant").
64. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S 44, 54, 57 (1996) (emphasizing that
sovereignty requires a state not be subject to suit by an individual without that state's consent).
See also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (stating that whether the Eleventh
Amendment is validly abrogated is determined by a two-part test); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (stating that the main basis for
Eleventh Amendment abrogation is enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that state sovereign immunity may not be abrogated
unless done so pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority).
65. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
66. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 670 (1999) (quoting Barnard, 108 U.S. at 447-48) (offering examples of when a state may
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
67. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett,and Protectionfor Civil Rights,
53 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2002).
68. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 675-76.
69. Id. at 676 (citing Fla. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home
Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981) (per curiam)).
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Furthermore, a state may not impliedly waive its immunity. 70 Under
the now discredited "constructive waiver" doctrine, a state gave up its
immunity by merely being a party to or present in a subject regulated by
Congress.7 '
In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks
Department,7 2 for example, the court allowed employees of a state-owned
railroad to bring suit against the railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA"),73 even though the statute contained no specific
reference to abrogation of immunity. 74 However, Parden was considered
"an anomaly" and was later expressly overruled. 75 The underpinnings of
the Parden decision were not reconcilable with the line of cases requiring
that the voluntary surrender of a state's sovereign immunity be express and
unequivocal. 76 In College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPost Secondary
Education Expense Board,77 the Court found a "fundamental difference"
between a state voluntarily giving up immunity and a state giving up
immunity merely by taking certain action. 78 Without an express,
unequivocal statement of consent, constructive waiver was tantamount to
abrogation: "[florced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of
the same coin - they are the same side of the same coin." 79 Therefore, only
when a state makes a clear, explicit statement of its intent to submit itself to
the jurisdiction of a court can its Eleventh Amendment immunity be
waived. 80

70. Id.
71. Id. at 680.
72. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
73. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
74. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192. FELA contains only the general statement that every state was
subject to suit if it owned or operated a railroad carrier that engaged in interstate commerce. 45
U.S.C § 51.
75. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
76. Id.
77. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
78. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 680-81. The Court believed that the constructive-waiver
experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and [saw] no merit in attempting to salvage
any remnant of it... Parden broke sharply with prior cases, and [was] fundamentally
incompatible with later ones. We have never applied the holding of Parden to another
statute, and in fact have narrowed the case in every subsequent opinion in which it has
been under consideration.
Id.
79. Id. at 683.
80. Id. at 675-76.
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Forced, Unconsenting Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
Immunity

Sovereign immunity may also be abrogated from an unconsenting
state. 81 Abrogation occurs when Congress has (1) "unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity," and, (2) acts "pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority." 82
a.

Expression of Intent to Abrogate Immunity

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity may only be abrogated
when Congress makes its intention to "abrogate the States' constitutionally
secured immunity from suit in federal court... unmistakably clear in the

language of the statute." 83 In most instances, the requirement is easily
fulfilled. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,8 4 for example, the
expression of intent stated in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") was deemed valid.85 Under the ADEA, employees could
maintain an action "against any employer (including a public agency) in
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." 86 The term "public
agency" included any state government, political subdivision of a state
87
government, or any agency or political subdivision of a state.
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,88 the Court
considered the constitutional validity of the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA") of 1993.89 The Hibbs Court concluded that the congressional
intent to abrogate state immunity was unmistakable, as the FMLA
contained identical abrogation language to the comparable language
contained in the ADEA, deemed acceptable by the Court in Kimel.90
81. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,55 (1996).
82. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
83. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
84. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
85. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (overruled in part, by Kimel, 528
U.S. at 79). The ADEA is no longer valid as it applies to the state or a state department or agency
as an employer. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79. The ADEA as applied to the state was invalid because it
relied "solely on Congress'[s] Article I commerce power" as its valid grant of constitutional
authority. Id. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-74 (quoting the expression of intent to abrogate
language in the ADEA and determining that such language sufficiently demonstrated Congress's
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
86. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000)).
87. Id. at 74. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203 (x) (2000), which was overruled by the Kimel court's
decision only as the statute applied to the state as an employer).
88. 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003).
89. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726.
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000) (asserting the immunity abrogation provision of the
FMLA).
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b.

Valid Grantof ConstitutionalAuthority

Historically, two portions of the Constitution served as grounds on
which the federal government bases abrogation of state sovereign
immunity: (1) the Interstate Commerce Clause 91 and (2) Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 92
The foundation for the use of the Interstate Commerce Clause as a
basis for abrogation was somewhat shaky, as the only case ever to rely on it
was overruled. 93 In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company,94 Pennsylvania
challenged an order to pay for cleanup costs and assessment of money
damages pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").95 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Brennan wrote that Congress's power to regulate
commerce included the authority to directly limit a state's assertion of
sovereign immunity.96 The Interstate Commerce Clause was held a valid
abrogation basis because it both granted power to Congress while taking
away power from the states and did so in one step, rather than in the two
steps in which it was accomplished by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 97 The Union Gas Court continued by stating that
Congressional power would be limited if it also did not have the power to
subject a state to liability for damages for a violation of a law passed by
Congress effecting interstate commerce. 98 Further, the Court stated that a
state subjected itself to abrogation of state sovereign immunity by
implication when it ratified the Constitution and subsequently ratified the
Eleventh Amendment. 99
10 0
However, seven years later in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
the Court expressly overruled Union Gas Co. and prohibited the future use
of any portion of the Commerce Clause as a basis for abrogation of state

91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall have the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); see
also Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (relying on
Congress's Article I power as a valid abrogation basis).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5; see also, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(relying on Section 5 as its basis for abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
93. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,76 (1996).
94. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
95. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 5-6.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 16-17. See infra Part II (C) (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id.
100. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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sovereign immunity. 10 In the case, the Seminole Native Americans sued
Florida and the state's governor for violating the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act ("IGRA").102 The Tribe claimed that Florida violated the IGRA's good
faith negotiation requirement when the state refused to negotiate on
including certain gaming activities in the gaming compact between the two
parties.103 The Seminole Tribe of FloridaCourt held that neither the Indian
Commerce Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause were sufficient
constitutional authority because the Court's decision in Union Gas Co.
stood in contradiction to the court's prior federalism jurisprudence,
especially the Hans v. LouisianalO4 decision prohibiting suit against states
without their consent.105 The court pointed out that in none of the Court's
decisions prior to Union Gas Co. had they "suggested that the bounds of
Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any
constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment."1 06
Additionally, the Court emphasized the fact that the Union Gas Co.
decision was not a majority, but a plurality and that there was no common
rationale underpinning the court's decision. 107
In criticizing the Union Gas Co. plurality decision, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Seminole Tribe of Floridathat "[a]s the dissent in Union
Gas recognized, the plurality's conclusion-that Congress could under
Article I expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article
III-'contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth
the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction."'108 Finally,
the Seminole Tribe of Florida Court criticized what it viewed as the overreliance on Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.109 The Fitzpatrick decision was based
upon a rationale "wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce
Clause."1 10 Again citing Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas Co., the
Court explained that Fitzpatrick could not justify a "limitation of the

101. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76. See also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (reaffirming the holding of Seminole Tribe of Fla.).
102. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 51-52; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)
(providing the text of the IRGA).
103. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 51-52.
104. 134 U.S. 1 (1897).
105. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 63-64.
106. Id. at 65.
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. at 65 (quoting Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
109. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
110. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 65.
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principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to
antecedent provisions of the Constitution."l"
In sum, the Eleventh Amendment protects a state or state-entity from
suit by private individuals within and outside the individual state.11 2 This
immunity may either be waived by an explicit statement of the intent to do
so by the state, or by abrogation or forced waiver of the state sovereign
immunity. 113 Abrogation or forced waiver can only occur when Congress
has made an explicit statement of its intent to abrogate, and when it acts
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.114 Although
Congress's Article I Commerce Clause power was once used as such a
basis, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Floridahas since prohibited
reliance on the Commerce Clause as a valid grant of constitutional
authority.115 Only Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a sufficient
grant of constitutional authority allowing for abrogation of state
11 6

immunity.
C.

SECTION

5

OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE ONLY VALID

BASIS FOR STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ABROGATION

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the
appropriate enforcement mechanism to enforce the amendment's
substantive guarantees, stating that "[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."17
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides those substantive
guarantees, stating that:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. 1l8
In addition to disavowing any future reliance on the Interstate
Commerce Clause as a constitutional basis for abrogation of state sovereign
111. Id. at 66 (quoting Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see generally
Kristen Healy, Comment, The Scope of Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Suits Arising Under
Patent Law After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 47 AM. U.L. REv. 1735 (1998) (discussing immunity
abrogation and the Seminole Tribe of Fla. decision).
112. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20.
113. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 55.
114. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
115. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 59-66.
116. Id. at 59.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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immunity, Seminole Tribe of Florida also reaffirmed prior precedent that
Congress could use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
state sovereign immunity."l 9 One of the most important predecessor cases
dealing with this use of Section 5 was Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer.120 At issue in
Fitzpatrick was whether Congress had the power to impose possible
liability for money damages on a state government employer who had
discriminated against an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in violation of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 The Fitzpatrick Court held that Congress was
not barred from abrogating a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when
it does so based on a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce one of the substantive provisions of the
amendment.122 The Fitzpatrick Court further determined that the terms of
the amendment itself "embody limitations on state authority" and Congress
may determine what constitutes "'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 123 Since
Fitzpatrick,numerous decisions have upheld this affirmative grant of power
under Section 5.124
1.

Scope and Limits of the Congress's Power to Proscribe
Remedial Section 5 Legislation

Congress has wide latitude in proscribing legislation to enforce the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 25 Previously, the
text and construction of the Fourteenth Amendment were held to be
"inconsistent" with Congress's ability to define what restrictions were
119. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 59; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (disavowing the use of the Commerce Clause as a basis for
abrogation of state sovereign immunity and reaffirming Seminole Tribe of Fla.); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) (explaining that only Section 5 "grant[s] Congress the
authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.").
120. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
121. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 447-48.
122. Id. at 456.
123. Id.
124. See e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S., 721, 727 (2003) (explaining that
Congress may use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit a state's Eleventh Amendment
protections); Garrett,531 U.S. at 364 (holding that while Congress may not rest the basis for its
abrogation of state immunity on Article I, it may use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (stating that
"appropriate" legislation can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant only to the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (quoting Fitzpatrick and reaffirming
that state sovereign immunity is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 755-56 (1999) (affirming Congress's power to authorize "private suits against nonconsenting
states" based on its Section 5 "enforcement power").
125. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
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placed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 126 However, the scope
of Congress's Section 5 power allows it to enact any
legislation [that] is appropriate... adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all
persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional

power. 127
Enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment also
necessitates that Congress be able to proscribe and prohibit a "broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
128
Amendment's text" in legislation.
Congress's enforcement power is not unlimited. 129 The power only
applies to Section 5 legislation that is preventative or remedial. 130 The line
between redefining substantive guarantees and what is remedial legislation
can be tenuous. 131 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,132 for example, several
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were upheld because of the
strong evidence of deliberate, systematic discrimination by several states
against those of a particular racial group in the voting process through
means such as literacy tests or property ownership requirements.l 3 3 The
Katzenbach Court found that the Voting Rights Act's prohibition against
the use of any "test" or screening device to determine voting eligibility was
a remedial measure taken to preserve the constitutional right to vote
regardless of one's "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."1 34 The

126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
127. Id. at 517-18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880)).
128. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
129. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
133. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 319-20, 333-34. In South Carolina when the Voting Rights
Act was enacted, for example, the state's statute required that in order to be eligible to vote, an
individual was required to demonstrate that he or she "[c]an both read and write any section of
[the State] Constitution submitted to [him] by the registration officer or can show that he owns,
and has paid all taxes collectible during the previous year on, property in this State assessed at
three hundred dollars or more." Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(4) (1965 Supp.) (alteration in
original)).
134. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 319-20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV). But see Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123-26 (1970) (declaring several of the 1970 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional). Congress exceeded its Section 5 enforcement powers, and
the 1970 amendments amounted to the decree of a substantive law by requiring all states to lower
the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 for all state and local elections. Id. The "Fourteenth
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Voting Rights Act was also buttressed by the long, well-documented history
of racial discrimination in the voting process, and the record of ineffectiveness of the voting rights laws in place at the time of the law's passage. 135
Congress has the authority to proscribe a wide-range of remedies,
including conduct that is not specifically prohibited to cure violations of the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 However, the
137
enforcement by Congress must be preventative or remedial.
2.

The Congruent andProportionalTest

The Supreme Court developed the current "congruent and
proportional" standard for determining the validity of Section 5 legislation
in City of Boerne v. Flores.138 In Boerne, the Catholic Archbishop of San
Antonio, Texas was denied a building permit for a church construction
project and sued the city under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") of 1993.139 The RFRA purported to eliminate unfair barriers or
punishments that limited people from freely practicing their religion.140
The Boerne Court found that Congress exceeded the scope of its authority
when it enacted the RFRA.141 The RFRA's mandate prohibiting the
government from "substantially burden[ing]" a person's right to exercise
their religion applied not just to the federal government and its branches,
but also to any department, branch, or agency of any level of the
government.142 The Court stated that the RFRA was "so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood
as responsive to, or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior."14 3
As a result, the Boerne Court formulated a new legal standard to
determine the validity of legislation affecting the Fourteenth

Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political
power as they see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications,
in either state or federal elections." Id. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring).
135. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-16.
136. Id. at 326.
137. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
138. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
139. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507 (declaring the RFRA contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bbbb4 unconstitutional).
140. Id. at 513. The RFRA was adopted in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision
in a religious discrimination case where members of a Native American church were fired from
their jobs and subsequently denied unemployment benefits when they ingested peyote in a
sacramental ceremony. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874(1990).
141. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
142. Id. at 515-16 (alteration in original).
143. Id. at 532.
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Amendment.4 The "congruence and proportionality" test states that
Section 5 legislation is valid only if it exhibits a "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."145 In order to be congruent and proportional,
the measures enacted to remedy the constitutional violation must address
the issue they claim to remedy, and must bear some sort of appropriate
balance between the proposed remedy and the alleged constitutional
violation. 146
D.

TITLE I OF THE ADA AND THE REFINEMENT AND APPLICATION OF
THE CONGRUENT AND PROPORTIONAL TEST

1 47 concerned
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett
the question of whether a state as an employer was protected by the
Eleventh Amendment from suit for money damages for alleged violations
of Title I of the ADA.148 The primary legal question at issue in Garrett was
whether in enacting the ADA, specifically Title I, Congress exceeded the
49
scope of its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Title I prohibits discrimination in an employment setting against qualified
individuals with a disability.150
Patricia Garrett was employed as the Director of Nursing,
OB/Gyn/Neonatal services at the University of Alabama Birmingham
hospital. 151 Her treatment for breast cancer required her to take substantial
leave from her job.152 Upon returning to work, Garrett was informed that
she would have to take a demotion.153 Milton Ash, also a respondent,
suffered from chronic asthma and sleep apnea.15 4 Ash requested that his
employer, the Alabama Department of Youth Services, allow him to switch
from nighttime to daytime shifts, and that they minimize his exposure to
carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke.15 5 The Department granted none of

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 530.
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Garrett,531 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 364-74.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
Garrett,531 U.S. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ash's requests. 156 Garrett and Ash both filed suit seeking money damages
under Title I of the ADA, and their cases were consolidated on appeal. 157
The Garrett Court reiterated that in order to validly abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, a law must both explicitly state
its intent to abrogate and must do so pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under Section 5.158 The court also reaffirmed the use of
the "congruent and proportional" test. 159
In applying the congruent and proportional test to Title I of the ADA,
the Garrett Court broke down the standard into two additional sub-part
requirements: (1) a narrow identification of the scope of the constitutional
right at issue, and, (2) a determination of whether Congress identified a
history or pattern of unconstitutional behavior that the law at issue is
seeking to remedy. 160
1.

NarrowDefinition of the ConstitutionalRight at Issue

The first step in applying the congruence and proportionality test was
to narrowly identify and define the constitutional right Congress was
seeking to enforce in enacting the legislation. 16 1 Identifying the constitutional right at issue in a Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required determining which of the three levels of constitutional scrutiny a court should
apply in reviewing the classifications made in the law: (1) rational basis
scrutiny 62 (2) intermediate scrutiny 63 or, (3) strict scrutiny.164 In Garrett,
156. Id.
157. Garrett,531 U.S. at 363.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 365.
160. Id. at 365, 368.
161. Id. at 365.
162. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (reiterating that "legislative
classification[s] must be sustained unless... 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental interest").
163. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (stating that a
classification based on gender must serve an "important governmental objective" and the means
chosen to achieve that objective must be "substantially related" to that objective) (citations and
internal quotations omitted)). See also Nev. Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
736 (2003) (maintaining that gender discrimination triggers some level of heightened scrutiny in
the context of traditional roles in the home and workplace); Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (explaining
that sex classifications require heightened scrutiny because a "sex characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society").
164. See e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(emphasizing that legal classifications made on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin are
rarely related to the "achievement of any legitimate state interest," and often reflect prejudice or
animus); Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (stating that there is
"nothing new" about the idea that a racial classification may be made only for "compelling
reasons"); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (explaining that a statute
will survive an equal protection challenge unless it interferes with a fundamental right or
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for example, the Court identified that disabled individuals, as a class of
people, were not members of a suspect class like individuals belonging to a
single racial group, nor were the disabled even a quasi-suspect class such as
members of the same gender. 165 As a result, an adverse employment action
by the State of Alabama or its related entity with regards to the disabled
would be allowed as long as it met the minimum requirements of rational
basis scrutiny.1 66 Under rational basis scrutiny, a state need not produce
precise reasoning behind passage of a particular law or a particular action or
decision, but instead the party challenging the law must demonstrate that
there is no conceivable, rational basis on which the state's action or
classification could be based. 167
Thus, a law or action making a classification based on a disability will
survive an equal protection challenge and is subject only to rational basis
review. 168 However, when the law or action also has elements that enforce
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause or
when the law or action at issue implicates some other fundamental
constitutional right, it is subject to strict scrutiny.169 Due Process claims or
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, such as the Due Process and
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, are deemed more
fundamental by virtue of their explicit inclusion in the Constitution. 170 Due
Process requires that a state "must afford to all individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process
Clause."l 7 1 The first requirement of the congruent and proportional test is
thus satisfied by a narrow definition of a fundamental constitutional right
subject to a heightened form of constitutional scrutiny.172

discriminates against a suspect class if the "classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose").
165. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 367.
168. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 438-39.
169. See e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1975) (discussing the fundamental
right to travel and freedom of movement).
170. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). The court in Faretta stated that because
the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment "are basic to our adversary system of criminal
justice, they are part of the 'due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to defendants in the criminal courts of the States." Id. Among the rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment include the right of the accused to a "speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," the right to "be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation;" the right to "be confronted with the witnesses against
him," and the right to have "[a]ssistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
171. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
172. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364-68 (2001).
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History and Patternof Violations of ConstitutionalRights

The second step in applying the congruent and proportional test is to
determine whether Congress sufficiently identified a history and pattern of
violations of constitutional rights by the states. 173 The Garrett Court
examined evidence of discrimination presented to or found by Congress in
the course of its consideration of the ADA.174 The Garrett Court stated that
the record demonstrated many instances of employment discrimination
against those with disabilities sufficient for Congress to make a general
statement that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities" and that discrimination against those with
disabilities is a "serious and pervasive social problem."' 75 However, the
Court held that the majority of the incidents in the record did not deal with
the activities of the States. 176 Many incidents cited may have even
amounted to unconstitutional discrimination and may have demonstrated an
unwillingness of a state official to make some sort of accommodation for
the disabled individual.177 However, the evidence fell well short of "suggesting a pattern of unconstitutional legislation on which Section 5
legislation must be based."1 78 The Garrett Court further explained that
mere anecdotal evidence could not replace official legislative findings in
demonstrating discrimination against the disabled.179 Additionally, the
anecdotes in the congressional record in question were submitted not to
80
Congress directly, but to a special task force on the rights of the disabled.1
Further, the Garrett Court reasoned that even if a history of discrimination
in employment by the States were to have been demonstrated, there might
have been a rational reason for the disparate treatment, such as a desire to
conserve fiscal resources by hiring those who could readily access existing
facilities without the employer having to modify them to accommodate the
individuals with disabilities.181
Finally, the Garrett Court drew a parallel between discrimination
considered by Congress in passage of the ADA's Title I with evidence
considered by Congress in consideration of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)).
Id.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 372.
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where some states required voters to submit to a literacy test to register to
vote. 182 The Court considered this too stark of a contrast and held that
in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages
against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the
States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy
imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the
targeted violation. These requirements are not met here, and to
uphold the Act's application to the States would allow Congress to
rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law... Section 5 does not so
broadly enlarge congressional authority. 183
The Court's holding, however, did not completely invalidate Title I, as
Title I still proscribed standards for the states and allowed for recovery of
money damages against private employers or individuals for employment
discrimination.184 Additionally, the Garrett Court expressly reserved
determination of whether Title II's remedies dealing with the services,
programs or other activity of a public entity was appropriate remedial
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.185
III. ANALYSIS
In Tennessee v. Lane,186 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for
a sharply divided court in which Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer joined.187 The majority held that Title II of the ADA, as applied to
the "fundamental right of access to the courts," was a "valid exercise of
Congress's Section 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."1 88 Justice Souter filed a concurrence in which Justice
Ginsberg joined, and Justice Ginsberg filed another concurrence in which
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer joined.189 Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined.190
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia also each filed separate dissenting
opinions. 191

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374.
Id. at n 9.
Id. at 360, n. 1.
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
Lane, 541 U.S. at 512.
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id.
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

The primary issue, as articulated by the majority, was whether Title II
of the ADA was a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power, or whether
it exceeded the scope of that authority.192 The majority applied the "congruent and proportional" test articulated in City of Boerne to Title II's
specific goals of remedying discrimination against people with disabilities
in the administration of public services. 193 Because the scope and nature of
the constitutional rights Title II sought to enforce went beyond equal
protection of the disabled and implicated rights protected by the Due
Process Clause, action taken or laws passed in violation of those rights were
subject to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny than the default rational
basis standard.194 The majority determined that Congress had not only
sufficiently demonstrated a history and pattern of unequal treatment of
people with disabilities in the administration of public services and
programs, but also that Title II was an appropriate remedy to redress this
pervasive unequal treatment. 195
1. Title II's Valid Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The majority in Lane reiterated that Eleventh Amendment immunity
may be abrogated when Congress makes an explicit statement of its
intention to do s0.196 The majority noted that this question was easily
answered because the ADA specifically provided that "[a] State shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United
States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for
a violation of this chapter."1 97
The Court then analyzed whether Congress abrogated state sovereign
immunity pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that amendment's substantive
guarantees.198 The Lane majority reaffirmed that Congress may go beyond
what is allowed in the Fourteenth Amendment's text itself in order to
fashion an appropriate, effective remedy to deter the unconstitutional
conduct, but that the proscribed remedy must exhibit a "congruence and

192. Id. at 513.
193. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004).

194. Id. at 540.
195. Id. at 522-29.
196. Id. at 517.

197. Id. at 518 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000)).
198. Id.
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proportionality" with the actual harm suffered.199 The majority also
expressed that the harm Title II sought to address was the well-documented,
unequal treatment and deprivation of fundamental rights of the disabled in
the administration of public services and programs. 200
2.

Title I Implicates FundamentalConstitutionalRights
Protectedby the Due Process Clause

In applying the first step of the congruent and proportional test and
defining the nature and scope of the constitutional right at issue, the
majority in Lane differentiated Title II from Title I of the ADA.201 The
Court determined that while Title II still sought to enforce the ADA's
"prohibition on irrational disability discrimination" under an Equal
Protection claim, Title II also implicated more basic constitutional
guarantees protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.202 The Court explained that the Due Process and Confrontation
Clauses of the Sixth Amendment 203 as applicable to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment, required that George Lane must be afforded the
right to be present at all stages of the criminal judicial proceedings against
him where his absence might frustrate the goal of fairness. 204 The Court
reasoned that all litigants must be afforded a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard" by removing all obstacles in the way of their full participation in a
court proceeding. 205 In addition, the Court also noted that Lane's Title II
claim implicated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the First
Amendment right of the public to access criminal proceedings. 206 Because
the discrimination suffered by George Lane as a result of his disability
related to his right to physically access the courts, the Lane Court stated that
it also necessarily implicated his Due Process rights, which were more basic

199. Id. at 518-19 (citing Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)).
200. Id. at 524-25
201. Id. at 522-23.
202. Id. at 523.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment states that "f[in
all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." Id.
204. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
205. Id. (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 349 (1971))
206. Id.
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and fundamental than the employment discrimination rights protected by
Title I of the ADA.207
3.

Congress Demonstrateda Sufficient History and Pattern of
DiscriminationAgainst the Disabled

In analyzing the second prong of the congruent and proportional test,
the Court examined what it called a great "volume of evidence"
demonstrating a pattern of discrimination against the disabled.208 First, the
Court synthesized examples of this pattern by citing to court cases demonstrating discrimination against the disabled in gaining access to the court
system, depriving the disabled access to or unequal treatment of the
disabled within the penal system, within the administration of public
education, and in ensuring voting rights.209 The Court also cited examples
of state statutes disqualifying individuals with physical or mental disabilities from voting, marrying, and serving as jurors.21 0 The majority then
noted several of its own decisions evidencing discrimination against the
disabled by a state agency.2 1 They also made note of the state and federal
court cases in which discrimination against the disabled was present in the
2 12
court access context.
Next, the majority examined the legislative history and record of
congressional committee hearings prior to the enactment of the ADA to find
a showing of a history and pattern of irrational disability-based discrimination. 2 13 The Court noted that despite existing state and federal attempts to
address disability discrimination prior to 1990, Congress concluded that
those efforts fell far short of seriously addressing the pervasiveness of
discrimination against the disabled.214 The Lane Court emphasized three
sources from the legislative record demonstrating Congress's findings: (1)

207. Id. at 522-24.
208. Id. at 528.
209. Id. at 525 n. 11-12 (citations omitted).
210. Lane, 541 U.S. at 524 n. 8-9 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted).
212. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525-26 (2004) (citations omitted); see also Layton v.
Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1998) (providing an example of a case involving a wheelchair
bound litigant who "was physically unable to attend the meeting because it was held on the
[inaccessible] second floor [of the courthouse]"); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 53334 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (describing how the only accommodation made for a wheelchair bound
litigant was to carry him to the second floor courthouse where there were no wheelchair accessible
restrooms, and no arrangements were made to carry him downstairs at the end of the day);
Pomerantz v. County of L.A. 674 F.2d 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (excluding blind individuals
from jury service).
213. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527 (2004).
214. Id. at 526 (citing S.REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1990)).
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general examples of unequal treatment of the disabled by States and their
related political entities contained in Appendix C to Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion in Garrett,2 15 (2) a report presented to Congress
demonstrating that the disabled lacked access to seventy-six percent of
public services because the programs or services were housed in physically
inaccessible buildings, 216 and, (3) testimony of witnesses before congres217
sional subcommittees describing the inaccessibility of local courthouses.
The majority explained that it was unnecessary that the evidence supporting
a pattern of constitutional violations to be based solely on actions by the
states alone. 218 As the Lane case in particular demonstrated, local
governments are treated as an "arm of the State" for purposes of applying
219
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the area of providing judicial services.
The Court cited to an example of this principle from Katzenbach.220 In
Katzenbach, the officials denying or implementing voting restrictions on
racial minorities were most often city and county officials.22 1 Additionally,
the Court determined that the Family and Medical Leave Act, as it was
upheld in Hibbs, applied to the states even though most of the evidence
presented in support of the Act concerned constitutional violations by
private employers or the federal government. 222 The Lane majority
concluded its analysis of the evidence supporting Title II by pointing out
that the evidence of the pervasiveness of discrimination was sufficient
because it was incorporated into the text of the ADA itself in the statute's
223
section on findings and purpose.
4.

Title II is a Limited, ProportionalRemedy to a Patternof
UnconstitutionalDiscrimination

Based on its examination of the evidence presented, 224 the Lane Court
found that Title II's requirements were congruent and proportional
measures taken to enforce the right of the disabled to access the judicial

215. Id. (citing Garrett,531 U.S. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
216. Id. at 527 (citation omitted).
217. Id. (citing Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the House Subcommittee on Select
Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41, 48 (1988)).
218. id. at 527-28 n. 16.
219. Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)).
220. Id. at 528 n. 16 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-15 (1966)).
221. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 312-15.
222. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528 n. 16 (2004) (citing Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-35 (2003)).
223. Id. at 529 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)).
224. See supra note 208-23 and accompanying text.
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system. 225 The remedy, however, was limited. While the Court's opinion
in Lane directed states to remove physical, architectural, or legal barriers to
access judicial services, the decision did not require the states to employ
any means necessary to allow the disabled to have full, unfettered access to
such services. 226 Instead, the Court required that states make "reasonable
modifications" which would not necessarily "fundamentally alter" the
service provided, and applied only if the individual seeking the accommodation would be otherwise eligible to participate in the proceeding being
held in such a building.2 27 Further, the Lane majority explained that
physical modification of existing judicial facilities would only be necessary
if the State could not discover a less costly way of accommodating the
disabled individual, such as relocating a judicial proceeding to an accessible
site, or assigning a state employee to assist the disabled individual to access
the program or service. 228 Thus, the Lane Court affirmed the decision of
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that Title II of the ADA was a
reasonable use of Congress's Section 5 authority to enforce the Due Process
rights of disabled individuals to have equal physical and legal access to the
courts.

229

B.

JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, agreed with the majority's
application of the congruent and proportionality test, but wrote separately to
urge the Court to undertake a more "expansive enquiry" into finding
evidence of discrimination against disabled individuals in a judicial courtroom or legal proceeding setting. 230 Souter reasoned that such an
undertaking would uncover evidence of even greater, more offensive discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and would offer more
2
support for Title II's remedial scheme. 31
C.

JUSTICE GINSBERG'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Ginsberg's concurrence, joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer, centered on the idea that maintaining a functioning federal system
of government necessitated that Congress not be required to "indict" or
present evidence of specific discrimination against the disabled against each
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 534-35.
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individual state before exercising its Section 5 authority. 232 Ginsberg stated
that members of Congress would be unwilling or reluctant to condemn their
2 3
own state as being a violator of the constitutional rights of the disabled. 3
Justice Ginsberg then urged that the Court examine the body of evidence of
discrimination against the disabled as a whole, and that this body of
evidence be found sufficient to "warrant the barrier-lowering, dignityrespecting national solution the People's representatives in Congress
elected to order." 234 Ginsberg's argument directly addressed an argument
made by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Hibbs.235
D.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT

Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent joined by Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas, argued that the majority's conclusion that Title II validly
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States was irreconcilable with the court's previous decisions and stood directly against the
principles embodied in the court's decision in Garrett regarding Title I of
the ADA.236 Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the majority opinion
applied the "congruent and proportionality" test incorrectly. 237 He further
argued that Title II was not remedial Section 5 legislation, but an attempt to
238
rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that defining the scope of the
constitutional right at issue was more difficult than in Garrettbecause Title
II involved rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 239 However, the Chief Justice condemned the majority's
application of the second step of the congruent and proportionality test,
stating that the majority identified "nothing in the legislative record that
shows Congress was responding to widespread violations of the due process
rights of disabled persons." 240
Chief Justice Rehnquist first argued that the court could not rely on
overbroad, generalized evidence of societal discrimination to specifically

concurring).
232. Id. at 537 (Ginsberg, J.,
233. Id.
234. Id. at 538.
235. Id. at 537. See also Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's dissent argued that in order to be subject to legislation
demonstrating Congress's Section 5 power, a state may demand that it, individually be shown to
have been acting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 741-42.
236. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 538 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 539.
238. Id. at 547-48.
239. Id. at 540.
240. Id. at 541.
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condemn violations of the due process rights of the disabled.241 The Chief
Justice continued by stating that some of the evidence of discrimination in
the fields of marriage, institutionalization laws, and public education could
be relevant if the Court were considering the constitutionality of the ADA
as an undifferentiated whole. 242 However, he argued that because the Court
elected a more focused, "as-applied" inquiry, the evidence of discrimination
that was offered was insufficient. 243 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
the type of generalized evidence relied upon by the majority in Lane was
rejected by the GarrettCourt as unsupportive. 24 4
Secondly, the Chief Justice argued that the nature and content of the
evidence relied on by the majority only supports discrimination by nonstate governments because it is the same generalized, congressional task
force evidence rejected by the Garrettdecision as insufficient, unexamined,
and anecdotal.2 45 He noted that the absence of actual evidence demonstrating that the disabled were unconstitutionally denied their right of access
to the court systems was "striking" and stated that neither the legislative
findings nor the committee reports "contain[ed] a single mention of the
seemingly vital topic of access to the courts." 246 The Chief Justice also
noted that in George Lane's specific case, Lane was only arrested for failure
to appear after he refused the assistance of the officers to help him to the
second floor courtroom, the Tennessee court had conducted a preliminary
hearing in the courthouse's first floor library to accommodate Lane, and the
Tennessee court later offered to hold all subsequent court proceedings to an
accessible courtroom in another county, which Lane refused. 247 Chief
Justice Rehnquist used such a possibility of an alternative forum or
alternative means of access to attack the sufficiency of the evidence of
discrimination relied on by the majority using the Civil Rights Commission
Report because the report contained "only a few anecdotal handwritten
reports of physically inaccessible courthouses" without mention of whether
the State could have "provided alternative means of access." 248
Finally, the Chief Justice noted that the remedial measures created by
Title II were massively overbroad and it could not be understood to be a

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Tennessee, 541 U.S. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 541-42 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-72

(2001)).

245. Id. at 547 (citing Garrett,531 U.S. at 370-71).
246. Id. at 543, 546.
247. Id. at 543 n. 4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3-4,
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667)).
248. Id. at 545.
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20051

congruent and proportional remedy. 249 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
the "incentive for Congress to craft § 5 legislation for the purpose of
remedying or deterring actual constitutional violations" would be eliminated by applying the limited, as-applied holding articulated by the Lane
250
majority only to the right of access to courthouses or court proceedings.
The Chief Justice wrote, "Congress can now simply rely on the courts to
sort out which hypothetical applications of an undifferentiated statute, such
25
as Title II, may be enforced against the States." 1
E.

JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT

Justice Thomas, in addition to joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent, wrote a brief, separate dissent simply to point out that he believed
Hibbs was wrongly decided, and would have disavowed any reliance on the
Hibbs opinion whatsoever.252
F.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT

Justice Scalia's dissent was based primarily on his rejection of the
congruence and proportionality test as a valid constitutional standard to
measure Section 5 legislation. 253 He noted that "such malleable standards"
turned into means by which judges could interject their own policy prefer254
ences, which wrongly turned the Court into "Congress's taskmaster."
IV. IMPACT
The Lane holding was strictly limited to the right of the disabled to
access courthouses and judicial proceedings. 255 After the Court's opinion
was issued, disability rights advocates lauded the decision, but they also
cautioned that the limited scope of the ruling could give rise to more
litigation and cause great confusion about the extent to which Title II of the
ADA applied to both fundamental and non-fundamental constitutional
protections. 256 Others argued that the "as-applied" framework articulated

249. Tennessee, 541 U.S. at 548-49.
250. Id. at 552.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 565-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 554-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 556-58.
255. Tennessee, 541 U.S. at 531.
256. See e.g., Valerie Jablow, Court-Access Decision's Narrow Scope Worries Advocates
For Disabled, 40 TRIAL July, 2004, at 92 (posing the argument that Lane represents a harmful
trend of narrowing the scope of the ADA).
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by the Lane majority opened the door to greater "judicial lawmaking" and
cast "a pall of unpredictability over the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence." 257
A.

UNCERTAIN FUTURE APPLICABILITY

The holding in Lane was limited in its applicability to future Title II
claims, as the decision only allowed abrogation of state sovereign immunity
in the context of disabled person's rights to physically access courthouses
for purposes of participating in judicial proceedings.25 8 The decision left
many unanswered questions about the scope and applicability of Title II in
other settings and to constitutional rights that were deemed nonfundamental.2 5 9 Further, Lane made clear that any discrimination claim
involving Title II of the ADA will be determined on an as-applied, case-bycase basis. 260 This interpretation of Title II does not preclude nonfundamental rights from being protected or prevent such individuals from
suing the states under the section under all circumstances. 26 1 However,
some have argued that this as-applied approach to Title II claims will
"'[leave] disabled people uncertain of their rights and [leave] advocates
uncertain of the results in any particular case."' 262
In the immediate aftermath of Lane, several district and circuit court
cases were remanded for reconsideration in light of the decision in subject
areas such as prisons, and the denial of prescription drug coverage. 263 In

257. State Sovereign Immunity - Congress's Enforcement Power Under Section 5 of the
FourteenthAmendment, 118 HARV. L. REV. 258, 260 (2004).
258. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004) The Lane majority stated:
[w]hatever might be said about Title II's other applications, the question presented in
this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for
money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to
voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the
constitutional right of access to the courts.
Id.
259. See David R. Fine, Tennessee v. Lane: Court Left Issues Open, 26 NAT'L L.J. 23 (June
7, 2004) (explaining that "the court did not answer the broader question of the application of Title
II in other settings").
260. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530 (2004) (stating "nothing in our case law
requires us to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated
whole").
261. Marcia Coyle, Patchwork Aftermath: Split Decision on Access to Courtsfor Disabled
Likely to Prompt Smattering of State Laws, More Litigation, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., June 1,
2004, at 8.
262. Id. (quoting Arlene Mayerson, directing attorney of the Disability Rights Education and
Defense Fund).
263. See Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1253, (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Lane to an inmate's
claim under Title II of the ADA and the inmate's claims under Eighth Amendment protections
from cruel and unusual punishment); see also Spencer v. Easter, No. 02-7722, 2004 WL 2093971,
at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (determining that Lane was inapplicable because the case involved
an ADA claim based on the non-fundamental right of being denied prescription drug coverage).
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Miller v. King, 264 for example, a disabled prison inmate filed a Title II
discrimination claim for monetary relief based on an alleged violation of the
Eighth Amendment.2 65 Despite the general evidence of disability discrimination in public services presented in Lane, the court in Miller was
required to apply the congruent and proportional analysis specifically to the
prison context.2 66 The court held that applying the remedies of Title II of
the ADA to the prison context would substantively rewrite the protections
of the Eighth Amendment and thus fail the congruent and proportional
test. 267 The Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, not Due Process, was the constitutional right at issue. 268 The
court wrote that the "Eighth Amendment has no effect on most prison services, programs, and activities, such as educational, recreational, and jobtraining programs... [i]n other words, the Eighth Amendment imposes a
narrow restriction-'cruel and unusual'-on only a limited sphere of prison
administrative conduct- 'punishment.' 269 The Miller court further contended that Title II encompassed prison services, programs, and activities
"beyond the basic, humane necessities guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment- to disabled prisoners." 70
Other "gray areas" where it is unclear whether a court would treat the
subject matter as a fundamental or non-fundamental right include access to
state parks, the ability of the disabled to utilize public transportation and
streets, and education. 71 Several recent lower court decisions on disability

264. 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004).
265. Miller, 384 F.3d at 1253. Miller also filed claims for injunctive relief under the ADA
against the warden of the prison he was housed in. Id. at 1267. The court held that Miller was
entitled to sue on the injunctive relief Title II claims. Id. Miller was housed in a maximum
security section of the Georgia State Prison. Id. at 1254. The cells in the unit are so small that in
order to give wheelchair bound inmates such as Miller some "minimal area in which to move
around," the beds from the cells are removed on a daily basis, but Miller claimed this procedure
was not being done in his case. Id. Miller also claimed that the toilets, showers, and other facilities in the unit were not wheelchair accessible and as such, he was denied the right to maintain
basic hygiene. Id. Additionally, Miller claimed that he was being denied access to medical care
for his paraplegic condition and denied rights afforded to able-bodied prisoners to access the
prison yard one day per month. Id. at 1254-55.
266. Id. at 1273.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1274.
270. Id.
271. See Coyle, supra note 261 (mentioning access to state parks as a non-fundamental
right); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 902 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing a suit by a handicapped individual under Title II because of inaccessible public
sidewalks). See also McNulty v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert Co., No. Civ.A. DKC 2003-2520, 2004
WL 1554401, at *3 (D. Md. July 8, 2004) (determining that Title II could not validly abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for a non-fundamental right claim such
as education).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:199

discrimination in an area such as education, however, indicate either an
unwillingness to apply Title II's protections to non-fundamental rights, or a
272
reluctance to make a ruling on either side of the issue.
B.

NORTH DAKOTA

In Lane, North Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem, acting in
his capacity as Attorney General on behalf of the State of North Dakota,
joined with the representatives of Alabama, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming in filing an amicus brief in support of Tennessee as the
petitioners. 273 The arguments in the amicus brief paralleled the arguments
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, and reflect North Dakota's
views with respect to Title II before the Lane decision. 274 In explaining
their interest in the case, the amici wrote of their "strong interest" in
preserving state sovereignty and in avoiding private damage claims based
on Title 11.275 They added that not only would being subject to damage
suits under Title II of the ADA for inaccessible courts be "enormously
costly," it would also divert funds away from remedying any incidents of
discrimination towards legal costs of defending against a Title II suit.276
Additionally, North Dakota and the other amici contended that existing
state protections against disability discrimination were sufficient to protect
the rights of the disabled.277 North Dakota's general policy of antidiscrimination prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, [and] the presence of any mental or physical
disability." 278 In addition to the general prohibition against discrimination
against the disabled, North Dakota's statute also specifically prohibits persons engaged in the provision of public services to engage in discriminatory
practices on the basis of mental or physical disability. 279 Further, any

272. See e.g., McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (holding that education was not a
fundamental constitutional right); Sacca v. Buffalo State Coll., State Univ. of New York, No. 01CV-881A, 2004 WL 2095458, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2004) (declining to determine whether
Title II of the ADA applied to employment discrimination by a public university because of the
unsettled nature of such claims and the split between circuit courts on the issue).
273. Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming in Support of Petitioner at 1, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 021667).
274. See supra note 236-51 and accompanying text (putting forth Chief Justice Rehnquist's
arguments in his dissenting opinion in Lane).
275. Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming in Support of Petitioner at 1, Lane (No. 02-1667).
276. Id. at 23-24.
277. Id. at 24.
278. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2004) (emphasis added).
279. Id. § 14-02.4-15. Specifically, the North Dakota statute states that:
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person with a public services or accommodations discrimination claim,
presumably including the right of access to the judicial system or
inaccessible courthouses, has the right under North Dakota law to file "an
action in the district court in the judicial district in which the unlawful
practice is alleged to have been committed or in the district in which the
person would have obtained public accommodations or services were it not
for the alleged discriminatory act." 280 Claimants may bring their actions for
either injunctive or equitable relief.28 1
V. CONCLUSION
In Lane, the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act as a valid use of Congress's Section 5 power to enforce the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, but only as it applied
to the fundamental right of disabled individuals to access the courts. 282 The
ADA contains a valid abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment
Immunity. 283 However, because of the limited scope of the Court's
holding, only the right of access to the courts was upheld, and the rights of
the disabled in other areas of public programs and services will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. 284
Lesley B. Foss*

[it

is a discriminatory practice for a person engaged in the provision of public services
to fail to provide to a person access to the use of and benefit thereof, or to give adverse
or unequal treatment to a person in connection therewith, because of the person's race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, or status with
respect to marriage or public assistance.
Id.
280. Id. § 12-02.4-19.
281. Id. § 12-02.4-20.
282. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
283. Id. at 517-18, 534.
284. Id.
*Thank you to my sister, Heather Foss Brandborg, for your input and support.

